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Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as 
amended). 
I I . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties appear to be in agreement as to the Statement of Facts which 
are generally comprised of the stipulated facts agreed to by the parties and 
submitted to the trial court together with testimony where each side testified as to 
their interpretation and understanding of the law and regulatory scheme. 
Page 1 of 12 
III. 
RESPONSE TO AND CLARIFICATION OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. 1: 
THE "CONSTRUCTION TRADES" DOES NOT INCLUDE AND IN FACT IS 
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM THE DESIGN, MANUFACTURE, ASSEMBLY 
OR CONSTRUCTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
Given the direction of Appellee's argument on "construction trades", it seems 
imperative that a clear understanding be reached as to what the Legislature 
intended by the use of the term. Unlike the term ''personal property" which is not 
defined in the pertinent statutes cited in the briefs of Appellant and Appellee, the 
term "construction trades" is statutorily defined and contains what Appellant 
believes to be a limitation intended by the Legislature for regulatory purposes. The 
definition is limited by its exclusion of personal property. As set forth in Appellee's 
brief it is found at Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-102(5) (1953, as amended), and 
states: 
(5) "construction trade" means any trade or occupation 
involving construction, alteration, remolding, repairing, 
wreaking or demolition, addition to, or improvement of 
any building, highway, road, railroad, dam, bridge, 
structure, excavation or other project, development or 
improvement to other than personal property, (emphasis 
added. 
Perhaps as significant is the absence of a more limited or restrictive definition 
for "personal property" within this definitional section of the code. It is Appellant's 
contention that if the Legislature intended to include modular construction within 
Page 2 of 12 
the regulatory scheme put forth by Appellee requiring that such manufacturers be 
licensed as building contractors that a first and essential step would have been to 
define or restrict the term "personal property" to mean something other than its 
general and accepted meaning or to include those types of construction of personal 
property within the regulatory scope of construction trades. 
What is further remiss from Appellee's brief is a citation to any judicial 
authority attempting to define the term "personal property" or "construction trades" 
to include activities similar to Appellant within the regulatory control of the Division 
of Professional licensing although Appellant does note that some administrative 
rulings of the Division have attempted to do so. 
POINT NO. 2: 
APPELLEE MISCONSTRUES APPELLANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE 
DIVISION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE. 
Appellee seems to infer from its argument that the Appellant is attempting to 
challenge the statutes in question. On the contrary, Appellant contends that these 
statutes are clear and unambiguous and convey a plain meaning which is 
inconsistent with the interpretation put forth by the Division of Professional 
Licensing. The Appellant contends that a reasonable interpretation of the statutes 
must include the plain meaning of "personal property" which meaning extends to 
and includes forms of personal property other than those that could be 
characterized as "Sears exceptions" or vehicles licensed with the Department of 
Motor Vehicles. In short, the Appellant does not challenge the language of the 
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various statutes as promulgated by the Legislature but the Division's restrictive and 
somewhat tortured interpretation for regulation purposes. 
POINT NO. 3: 
APPELLEE FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE STATUTORY USE OF THE 
TERM "PERSONAL PROPERTY" RENDERS THE STATUTES AMBIGUOUS OR LEADS 
TO AN UNREASONABLY CONFUSED, INOPERABLE OR BLATANT 
CONTRADICTION OF THEIR EXPRESS PURPOSE. 
The Appellant and Appellee have set forth the well settled rules for statutory 
construction in Utah which seek to interpret statutes by utilizing the plain meaning 
of their words. See State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah App. 1992). See also 
World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Co., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). 
As has been stated previously, the Utah Courts assume that each term in a statute 
is used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. As noted in Appellee's brief, only if the 
language of a statute is ambiguous do the Utah Courts resort to other modes of 
construction. However, Appellee fails to demonstrate how the Legislature's use of 
the term "personal property" renders the meaning of the statute ambiguous. 
Appellee further contends that a corollary to the rule is that a statutory term should 
be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the 
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably 
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the 
statute. Appellant agrees. However, Appellant contends that Appellee has failed to 
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demonstrate how an interpretation of the statute utilizing the plain meaning of 
''personal property" renders this statute confusing, inoperable or in blatant 
contradiction of its express purpose. To the contrary, the Appellant contends that 
the statutory language as promulgated is clear, decisive and definitive in expressing 
the Legislature's intent to regulate the construction trades through licensing and 
exempt certain similar activities that include a person engaged in the sale or 
merchandising of personal property that by its design or manufacture may be 
attached, installed or otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted with a 
person, firm or corporation licensed under this chapter to install, affix or attach that 
property. Appellant believes that it is important to point out that this exemption is 
a qualified one. It requires that such personal property be installed, affixed, or 
attached by one who is licensed. In the instant case, as set forth in the stipulated 
facts, paragraph 3, attached to Appellee's Appendix 1, the "[Appellant] transports 
and delivers the structure by ulow-boy" and off loads it at the site. The Appellant 
does not do the site work, e.g. excavation, foundation, utilities, etc., nor does the 
Appellant actually install or attach the structure to the foundation. . . installation of 
the unit becomes the responsibility of the owner or a licensed contractor." In other 
words, the rationale set forth by the trial court in its Certificate of Probable Cause 
and reiterated in Appellee's brief that the "exception would swallow the rule" is not 
true. Since the statute requires that a licensed contractor be involved in the 
installation or attachment of such property to land, the Appellant is nothing more 
than a supplier of assembled materials to a contractor. The Appellant contends 
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that the legislature had the foresight to see that requiring the licensing of a supplier 
of materials to a contractor would constitute an unnecessary redundancy in the 
regulatory scheme . Fabrication of quality materials and compliance with the 
appropriate building codes, the concern that did remain was insightfully addressed 
by the Legislature in Chapter 56 which was intended to regulate the manufactured 
housing industry. It assures that such construction meets with uniform and/or 
federal housing building requirements monitored through inspections. The 
contractor and local building inspector require inspection certificates to insure that 
the item of personal property meets with the appropriate building code 
requirements. In the case of the Appellant, the product does not leave the yard 
until all inspections have been made. See paragraph 4, of Stipulated Facts, 
Appellees Brief, Appendix I. 
The Appellant contends that the Legislature foresaw that a contractor would 
be involved in the process at the time of attachment and therefore considered it 
unnecessary to require the manufacturer of the unit to also be licensed as a 
contractor under Chapter 56. Consequently, Appellant is not asserting that 
Chapters 55 and 56 are mutually excluded as asserted by Appellee; rather, 
Appellant asserts that the two chapters work in conjunction with each other to 
insure that the one who installs or attaches personal property to real property is 
licensed as a contractor and the materials received, whether assembled or 
unassembled, meet with the requirements promulgated under the Uniform Building 
Standards Act. Such interpretation is plain, clear, and operable for regulatory 
Page 6 of 12 
purposes and adequately protects the general public from the health and safety 
issues associated with poor workmanship or poor quality materials. 
Appellant contends that notwithstanding Appellee's assertion to the contrary, 
there is no independent public policy consideration to require licensing of 
contractors except to afford a reasonable expectation of good workmanship and 
standard quality materials in the construction of a home. This is accomplished by 
the present statutory framework that interprets the language consistently with its 
plain meaning. It does not require the tortured interpretation put forth by Appellee 
to accomplish the public policy consideration. 
POINT NO. 4: 
APPELLEE ONLY CONFUSES THE ISSUE BY ATTEMPTING TO DISTINGUISH 
APPELLANT AS ONE WHO ACTUALLY CONSTRUCTS MODULAR HOMES. 
The Appellee attempts to draw distinction by asserting that Appellant is not 
only engaged in the sale or merchandising of modular homes but actually 
constructs modular homes. Appellee concedes that he constructs modular homes. 
He constructs modular homes just as a mobile home manufacturer or a 
manufactured home manufacturer constructs homes. Like a manufactured or 
mobile home, the Appellant's products are generally complete and unattached to 
real property. Notwithstanding, this is all addressed in the regulatory scheme 
provided through Chapter 56 which distinguishes between mobile homes, 
manufactured homes and modular construction only for the purpose of determining 
which building code requirements apply. In Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-3(12) 
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(1953, as amended) the Appellants particular form of construction or assembly is 
defined under the term "modular unit". Which requires that Appellant's product 
conform to the uniform building codes and not the HUD building code. 
Moreover, as previously stated, the definition of "construction trade" in 
Chapter 55 expressly excludes construction of personal property. The attempt by 
Appellee to disqualify Appellant by classifying the activity as "construction" as 
opposed to "manufacturing, assembling, or designing" is a non sequitur that adds 
nothing to the rational or logical interpretation of the Statue or the intended 
regulatory scheme of the construction trades or building code requirements. 
POINT NO. 5: 
THE INTERPRETATION OFFERED BY APPELLEE OF "PERSONAL PROPERTY" 
WOULD RESULT IN THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN A MANNER THAT 
WOULD RENDER IT UNREASONABLY CONFUSING, INOPERABLE AND 
IN BLATANT CONTRADICTION OF ITS EXPRESS PURPOSE. 
While Appellant contends that the language of the Statute is plain and 
consistent with its ordinary use and meaning, the interpretation offered by Appellee 
is illogical, confusing, and inoperable and extends the regulatory authority of the 
Division blatantly beyond its express purpose. Appellee offers two (2) explanations 
as to why the term "personal property" as set forth in Section 305(6), Chapter 55, 
Title 58, Utah Code Annotated should be limited to exclude Appellant. On the one 
hand, Appellee contends that the personal property exemption was intended to 
cover only components such as Sears products which they refer to as part of the 
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"Sears exception/' These would be products such as refrigerators, washing 
machines, garbage disposals, light fixtures, toilets, sinks, electrical wiring, outlet 
plugs, circuit breakers, sewer pipes, taps, faucets, etc. Effectively, any item of 
personal property that could be purchased at a Sears store (or Appellant assumes a 
similar merchandise store) would qualify under the exemption. This of course limits 
the statutory meaning of the term "personal property" to a decision to be made by 
management of a Sears store. Since the Sears catalog has been known to change 
from year to year, a definition based upon a "Sears exception", is always illusive of 
clear understanding its in scope and meaning. What is even more confusing, 
however, is that this rationale is inconsistent with Appellee's second argument of 
limitation, that of licensing. 
The second argument of Appellee is that Appellant should not be excluded 
from licensing under the personal property exemption because he is not licensed 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Appellee cites to Administrative Rule 156-
55a-102(a) which defines personal property to mean "factory built housing and 
modular construction, as a structure which is titled by the Department of Motor 
Vehicle, State of Utah, and taxed as personal property."1 While at the time the 
Administrative Rule was enacted provision was made for the licensing of modular 
construction through the Department of Motor Vehicles, a subsequent change in 
1
 If there is a factual issue of nonpayment of personal property taxes by Appellant it was 
not established at the hearing. Appellee presented no evidence and Appellant's testimony was 
uncontroverted on cross examination that he paid personal property tax on his construction units. 
See Hearing Transcript, Volume II, page 146. 
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the law exempted modular construction from licensing.2 See Utah Code Annotated 
§ 41-la-504(4) (1953, as amended). Since the Administrative Rule was never 
changed to correspond with the change in the law, the Division now argues that the 
Rule has a meaning that is exactly the opposite of its previous intention and 
application which now effectively excludes all modular construction by implying that 
the same is not personal property. While this form of logic defies a general and 
accepted understanding of the term, it does nothing to explain why Appellee now 
believes it has the broadened regulatory authority to require that modular 
construction in the State of Utah only be done by licensed contractors. There is no 
express legislative regulatory authority or directive supporting such an 
interpretation and the application of such regulatory scheme would effectively 
exclude even what has been identified by Appellee as the "Sears exception". In 
short, Appellee's interpretation of "personal property" does nothing to clarify the 
meaning of the statutes but in fact renders the term ambiguous, confusing, 
inoperable and blatantly contrary to their express purpose. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, and also for those 
2Utah Code Annotated Section 41-lc-504(4), became law in 1992 Prior thereto, 
provision had been made for the licensing of modular construction as a motor vehicle The new 
law exempts modular construction from licensing However, Administrative Rule 156-55a-102(8) 
which refers also to modular construction was never changed or amended to reflect this statutory 
change in the law and thus creates the implication that modular construction should now be 
excluded from the definition of personal property. 
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reasons set forth in Appellant's Brief, having replied to Appellees Brief, prays that 
relief be granted in reversing the trial court's decision, or remanded ordering that 
judgment be entered consistent with the plain meaning of the statute, together with 
such other and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this ^ 7 ^ d a v of 
Page 11 of 12 
C E R T I F I C A T E . O F M A I L I N G 
I hereby certify that on the _ ^ 2 r * t a y of / ^ S j f " 2 0 ^ . I did 
mailed a true and correct photocopy of the REPLY OF APPELLANT BOHNE, by way of 
U.S. mail, postage fully prepaid, thereon, to the following: 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main Street, Suite 1 
Post Office Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0428 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Post Office Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, UT 841-14-0230/ / " 
Page 12 of 12 
